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Abstract 
Social media represents a space where the more politically engaged can commune around 
issues and events of importance and exchange views. Often the spaces created, especially 
when hosted by a partisan or campaign organization, tend to be ideologically 
homogenous eschewing debate or critique. The UK’s referendum on EU membership 
represents an opportunity to explore how citizens use social media, in this case Facebook, 
to express their political views in relation to a controversial and polarizing issue of 
significant national importance. The data extracted from the public pages of the four most 
important Leave and Remain campaigns are used to explore the strategies of Leave and 
Remain campaigns as well as the reactions of subscribers. The data show the Leave 
campaign the most proactive posters, creating more engaging content and, in turn, 
gaining an advantage in terms of visibility online. Leave supporters were also more prone 
to act as cheerleaders for the campaign applauding attacks on Remain leaders and 
spokespeople and promoting campaign slogans. Remain subscribers similarly endorsed 
negative messages but were keener to debate the detail behind slogans and critique the 
official campaign strategy and messaging. Endogenous factors relating to the 
demographic of the supporter groups and the campaign messages, as well as exogenous 
factors relating to the social norms of behaviour with the pages, are discussed as 
explanatory factors for the different dynamics observed. Notwithstanding the limitations 
of big data discourse analysis, we thus suggest the Facebook communities around each 
campaign page can be seen as microcosms of wider supporter groups and thus we 
propose that analysis of discourse within social media platforms such as Facebook allow 
better understanding of wider societal engagement with political communication and the 











The mediation of politics has long been argued to stimulate interest, engagement and 
discussion (Graber 2003). Within social media environments, these processes can be 
almost instantaneous. Accidental exposure to a political message can grab users’ interest 
and lead to further actions including liking, sharing and commenting (Koc-Michalska et 
al. 2016). Political campaigns therefore attempt to produce content that can stimulate 
interest as well as creating pages that can be liked, so building a supportive community 
around an organization or specific campaign. Supportive communities are particularly 
useful as they provide free labour to the campaign, individuals willing to like and share 
content and so extend the reach of a particular message within online networks. 
Theoretically, a campaign’s page should operate like an echo chamber; the community 
will be ideologically homogenous and their actions and comments will be supportive and 
positive (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). However much of the commenting found on social 
media pages and platforms is what has been referred to e-expressive behaviour, 
individuals voicing their opinions and concerns about issues that matter to them, and 
responding to other commenter’s (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013). Thus, campaign pages 
might have a more heterogeneous character. This research explores the nature and 
character of user discourse in response to the Facebook posts of the main campaigns on 
either side of the UK referendum on EU membership. The highly divisive and 
contentious topic allows an insight into the dynamics of social media users’ engagement 
with politics, and the extent social media can be viewed as a space for open discussion or 
homogenous cheerleading. 
Research context 
The United Kingdom’s referendum on membership of the European Union offered 
citizens a choice on one of the most important decisions of their lifetime, expectedly the 
campaign proved to be highly divisive as well as emotionally and politically charged. 
Media coverage and opinion pollsters consistently showed the nation was polarized 
(Goodwin and Heath 2016a), with those referred to by the epithets Remainers and 
Brexiteers pitted against one another. The campaign appeared to increase polarization 
(Bogdanor 2016), but were these two groups as distinct as media reporting suggests. One 
way of understanding the attitudinal and communication dynamics of these groups is 
through an examination of public contributions to the campaign on Facebook. We 
suggest that social media can be viewed as a microcosm of society. The users who 
discuss politics maybe the most engaged, and so unrepresentative of the broader 
population, but they express views that are likely shared by a wider group of citizens 
(Anstead and O’Loughlin 2015). In particular, the extent to which users express their 
views with passion and consistency and demonstrate high engagement can be indicative 
of the trends in and strength of attitudes relatively (Ceron et al. 2014), a phenomenon 
evidenced when comparing partisan commitment online during the 2015 United 
Kingdom general election (Lilleker and Jackson 2017). 
E-expression and political discourse on social media 
While the mediation of politics has long been suggested to provide pathways to greater 
levels of political engagement (Graber 2003), such arguments have recently focused on 
the affordances offered by digital technologies and in particular social media. Social 
media is argued to operate as a third space (Graham et al. 2015; Wright et al. 2016), 
where discussion can take place that bridges social and ideological divides and where 
citizens can discuss important issues of the day, find common ground, debate and 
develop an understanding of differing viewpoints (Routledge, 1996). Although 
conversations can be symmetrical, it is more likely for them to be asymmetrical and 
fragmented over time (Gunitsky 2015). Users can enter into intense conversations or post 
graffiti-style comments (Jackson and Lilleker 2009); but both represent expressive 
behaviour (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013), the voicing of attitudes and opinions that may be 
representative of broader attitudinal trends (Ceron et al. 2014). 
The patterns of behaviour can take place with open forums designed to be 
apolitical (Jackson et al. 2013) as well as more partisan or less ideologically 
heterogeneous communities. Research shows politically engaged Facebook users have a 
greater tendency to form or join communities that are ideologically homogenous, focused 
on a single perspective towards an issue or support for one party or organization 
(Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). This behaviour is encouraged by political organizations. 
Organizations create bespoke pages, publicize them in order to build a community and 
then persuade that community to become more active (Jackson and Lilleker 2009). While 
these organization-oriented spaces fail to meet the criteria of third space public spheres, 
they may resemble in character the offline spaces where political talk occurs 
(Papacharissi 2002). In everyday, offline, life, people similarly have a tendency to talk 
politics with the like-minded, and when not they eschew politics altogether, and therefore 
the more homogenous online communities may represent microcosms of society 
(Anstead and O’Loughlin 2015). This hypothesis suggests social media discussions 
present opportunities to garner insights about wider public attitudes, while studying the 
patterns of discourse can also teach us about the factors that shape the dynamics of online 
interactions. 
Exploring user discourse dynamics within spaces created by a campaign can also 
allow an understanding of how political communication stimulates e-expression. Politics 
remains a minority interest; interest can increase during contentious events and users can 
engage in a variety of forms of activity depending on their commitment (Warren & 
Gaskill. 2015). The host communication strategy and behaviour of other users within 
communities may incentivize or disincentivize starting or joining conversations (Zhu et 
al. 2017). Some users are incentivized sufficiently by the fact that Facebook offers a 
space for self-expression (Vraga et al. 2015), and their self-efficacy can be increased if 
they receive positive feedback on their contributions (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska 2017). 
Thus, users will perform in ways likely to maximize positive feedback, in particular when 
sharing content or offering opinions; these community dynamics therefore might perform 
in the same way as any communicative space. Vocal contributors may make controversial 
statements to get a response or make statements that everyone in the community agrees 
with in order to gain acceptance. But, at least in theory, the choice of communication will 
depend on the individual as well as the communication dynamic of the community (Zhu 
et al. 2017). We explore the agendas of pages created by the Leave and Remain 
campaigns during the 2016 UK EU membership referendum in order to explore if 
communities that represent socio-political polar opposites do indeed demonstrate unique 
communicative characteristics that validates the view that these represent societal 
microcosms while also reaching some conclusions regarding the dynamics of the 
campaigns and their supporter communities. 
The key questions posed in this article are as follows: 
1. What were the communication dynamics within the specific spaces during the 
course of the campaign? 
2. What are the communicational drivers of engagement, can patterns of actions 
(Likes and Shares) and interactions (Comments and Conversations) be 
attributed to communicative strategies or agendas? 
3. Were the communities homogenous; or is there evidence of pluralist debating, 
diversity or challenges made to the ideational hegemony? 
Methodology 
Data were captured from the Facebook pages of four organizations: the two official 
Campaigns, LeaveEU and StrongerIN, as well as two unofficial but reasonably large 
competitors, Lets Stay In Europe (LetsStayIn) and VoteLeave. The data corpus 
constitutes all posts made to the page by the host, the numbers of likes, shares and 
comments (first order direct to the page and second order on shared versions of a post), as 
well as all the text comments by visitors to those pages. The data were scraped from each 
page using a version of the Vox Populi harvester (Bonacci et al. 2016), adapted for 
harvesting Facebook data. The data were exported into Microsoft Excel as a file 
including all text as well as the date stamp and details of user reactions. 
Analysis involved quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The text data from 
posts and comments were coded by words used, with words being attributed to particular 
communication strategies and policy areas. Samples of posts using popular terms were 
selected to ensure that the context of word use was understood. For example, the 
appearance of the word jobs in posts or comments usually related to economic arguments 
for remaining or leaving the European Union (EU), similarly words such as astonishing 
and ghastly were used to challenge opposition claims and blame opponents for 
exaggerating or lying. The categorizations we developed by looking qualitatively at the 
posts and gaining an understanding of how the campaigns utilized language allowed us to 
identify four policy areas (economy, sovereignty, immigration and cooperation (security 
and the environment)); two persuasive devises (personalization, referencing individual 
names; and the attribution of blame, using pejorative language against a group or 
individual) and finally campaigning posts regarding events or requests to contribute. The 
categorization cannot capture every post but, due to the size of the corpus of data, 
analysis provides indications on which broader assumptions can be based (Jungherr 
2015). The posts captured from each campaign number 78% (LetsStayIn), 65% 
(LeaveEU), 64% (VoteLeave) and 52% (StrongerIN). 
To overcome the major flaw with big data studies, the inability to test 
assumptions drawn from automated categorizations of a large body of text, we conducted 
qualitative analysis involving reading and understanding selected posts that attracted 
intense discussion (multiple comments by groups of users) as well as posts that attracted 
only single comments by multiple users. Posts were selected purposefully (as above) as 
well as through random sampling in order to validate the assumptions underpinning the 
quantitative coding of words and categorization of posts (Laver et al. 2003). The 
qualitative analysis permitted us to identify key examples of dynamics and common 
phenomena that cannot be reliably identified using text analysis programmes (Angus et 
al. 2013). The qualitative observations are also used to provide examples of campaign 
communication strategies as well as the kinds of responses that posts of a certain type or 
topic were likely to elicit. 
Mapping the communities 
Prior to focusing in-depth on the analysis of the discourse strategies found in host posts 
and user comments, it is instructive to offer a general description of the levels of 
interactivity on these pages. Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate that the more proactive a 
campaign is in generating content the greater responses it earns from the community. 
Stronger In and Lets Stay In seemed to demonstrate an element of complacency in the 
campaign; they created their profiles later and then posted less which correlate with 
having a less active following. Follower activity might however also be an indicator of 
their enthusiasm, a point we will revisit when focusing on their commenting behaviour. 
In contrast to the sites promoting the Remain side, the LeaveEU campaign was 
exponentially most proactive; the campaign was very active as soon as the referendum 
was officially put before parliament, maintained its communicative advantage in every 




Table 1: Activities on Facebook pages by hosts and visitors 


























(1) Total posts published 1813 896 939 769 590 393 51 29 
(2) Total posts reacted to 1806 891 923 767 590 393 51 29 
(3) % of posts reacted to (2)/(1) 99.6 99.4 98.3 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(4) Total reactions 8,704,358 5,864,885 4,533,944 4,401,208 2,306,707 2,110,327 3391 3121 
(5) Average reactions per post reacted to (4)/(2) 4820 6582 4912 5738 3910 5370 66 108 
(6) Total reacting visitors 689,773 570,624 501,152 496,164 583,678 565,654 1427 1396 
(7) Average reactions per reacting visitor (4)/(6) 12.6 10.3 9.0 8.9 4.0 3.7 2.4 2.2 
(8) Total posts shared 1775 872 822 672 585 391 49 28 
(9) % of posts shared (8)/(1) 97.9 97.3 87.5 87.4 99.2 99.5 96.1 96.6 
(10) Total shares 4,890,815 3,799,004 2,549,881 2,510,368 1,290,009 1,217,761 1694 1549 
(11) Average shares per shared post (10)/(8) 2755.4 4356.7 3102.0 3735.7 2205.1 3114.5 34.6 55.3 
(12) Total posts commented on 1806 891 813 668 590 393 51 29 
(13) % of posts commented on (12)/(1) 99.6 99.4 86.6 86.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(14) Total comments 1,164,061 718,730 483,710 466,689 941,928 778,472 2168 1770 
(15) Average comments per post commented on 
(14)/(12) 645 807 595 699 1596 1981 43 61 
(16) Total commentators 208,063 152,133 121,950 119,432 132,683 121,783 564 475 
(17) Average comments per commentator (14)/(16) 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.9 7.1 6.4 3.8 3.7 
(18) Average commentators per post commented on 493 612 440 519 702 911 23 32 
(18) Average comments per commentator per post 
commented on (14)/((12)*(16)) 0.0031 0.0053 0.0049 0.0058 0.0120 0.0163 0.0754 0.1285 
Figure 1: Posts by month per campaign profile between September 2015 and September 2016. 
The Leave campaign sites also posted most visual material, which is found to be 
more engaging and shareable (Cvijikj and Michahelles 2013). Figure 2 shows that 
LeaveEU posted exponentially greater numbers of photos and videos, and within June, 
the two Leave campaigns posted 320 photos and 229 videos between them compared to 
30 and 62, respectively, for Remain. The LeaveEU site also referenced the mainstream 
media using hyperlinks, sometimes to reinforce their arguments, at other points to 
criticize opponents, a strategy also followed by LetsStayIn. While links to media 
coverage featured in StrongerIn posts, the overwhelming majority of hyperlinking was to 
their own website suggesting their strategy was to direct their Facebook subscribers to 
their main campaign hub. StrongerIn also posted text-heavy expert testimony. Thus, 
based on previous analysis of social media behaviour, although from a corporate 
communication context, the pro-Leave campaigns produced a significantly greater 
number of posts that prove most likely to receive the likes and shares that extend the 
network reach of a message (Cvijikj and Michahelles 2013). This general norm of online 
behaviour seems vindicated in this context by the numbers of reactions received overall 
and per post. 
Figure 2: Posts by month by post type per campaign profile within the campaign period 
23 January–23 June 2016. 
The differences in the vibrancy of the communities are marked. Although the 
average number of comments per post was higher for StrongerIn (see Figure 3), the 
LeaveEU campaign attracted slightly more comments overall as well as attracting a 
higher number of individual commenters. So those active on the ‘Remain’ pages were 
smaller in number but proved more frequent in utilizing the affordances for expressing 
their views. Leave attracted a larger group of subscribers who commented less frequently. 
Figure 3: Distinct commentators by month per campaign profile between September 2015 
and September 2016. 
Combining community activity data for each side, it is clear the two Leave 
campaign sites gained the greatest traction, between them gaining double the amount of 
shares in May and a third more in June at the height of the campaign. While Vote Leave 
complemented and at points equalled the support enjoyed by the official LeaveEU page, 
LetsStayIn did not offer a bolster to the Remain cause. Therefore, while StrongerIn did 
not lag far behind in the crucial June month, LeaveEU gained traction early and when 
combined with the more controversial Vote Leave this side had a clear advantage in 
being made more visible through having a more active followership. Therefore, more 
non-engaged Facebook users may have been accidentally exposed to pro-Leave material 
if they were connected to the networks of subscribers to their pages. Furthermore, given 
the more engaging nature of the material, pro-Leave arguments may have framed some 
debates through their online advertising strategy (Campbell and Lee 2016) building an 
atmosphere favourable to the pro-Leave argument. StrongerIn content appears to have 
proved less attractive to supporters, and so was not promoted as much, suggesting either 
they did not want to associate themselves with the content to the same extent as pro-
Leave supporters or they were insufficiently committed to actively push campaign 
content. 
Divergent agendas: Divergent conversations 
The number of comments received map onto the level of proactivity of each campaign 
page, but crucially within the final month of the campaign, June 2016, there is greater 
parity (see Figure 3). However, when analysing the nature of comments, there are 
marked differences in the agendas of commenters, how they map on the overall campaign 
agendas, and the nature of the comments themselves. 
Firstly we focus on whether comments were made directly to posts or to the 
shared variants. One might hypothesize that first-order comments, from the community 
of individuals liking a page, are more likely to be supportive than second-order comments 
from people who do not like the page. This is particularly the case as first-order 
comments, made directly to the post on the campaign page, can be censored; comments 
on campaign posts shared to the profiles of individuals are beyond the control of the 
original source. As demonstrated in Figure 4, the numbers of second-order comments 
were much higher on average for StrongerIn posts. This represents the first indication that 
the Stronger In campaign might have earned a higher level of pluralist debate. 
Figure 4: First- and second-order commenting patterns by profile 23 January 2016–23 
June 2017. 
Table 2 shows the number and percentage of occurrences of words that can be 
attributed to our categories in the campaign posts. The first point to highlight is that all 
these pages were campaign-oriented, with the majority of categorized posts repeating 
slogans while attempting to mobilize their Facebook followers. Vote Leave was most 
campaign-oriented with 90 per cent of categorized posts included words related to 
campaigning; the next rival was Stronger In with 83 per cent of posts. Personalization 
was also used by both campaigns to give credibility to their arguments; Leave campaigns 
utilized public figures (for example entrepreneur James Dyson and former Head of the 
British Chamber of Commerce John Longworth as well as sports personalities Sol 
Campbell and Ian Botham and reality television star Joey Essex). Remain campaigns 
drew on expert opinion (including entrepreneur and TV personality Karren Brady, 
physicist Prof. Stephen Hawking and Bank of England Governor Mark Carney). 
Personalization also stretched to negative posts however. Leave campaigns questioned 
the motives for endorsing Remain: Vote Leave asked: ‘are they doing it for a 
knighthood’. David Cameron also came under fire for his perceived failure to negotiate a 
better deal for the United Kingdom in the EU and then his support for Remain; the 
‘dodgy Dave’ moniker was frequently used to undermine his personal credibility. 
There was also evidence of discrete political agendas however. The category that 
featured prominently, and almost uniquely on Leave campaign pages were references to 
sovereignty, often featuring the slogan ‘Take Back Control’; immigration was also an 
area that was more prominent in the posts on Leave pages referring to various threats 
from EU expansion (Turkey, Albania and Macedonia being referenced) as well as the 
threat of Islamist extremists disguising themselves as refugees. A significant number of 
Leave campaign posts would show a picture or video, some referencing media reports, a 
simple argument relating to one of these latter issues and the Take Back Control slogan. 
The meme style-adopted suggests these posts were designed to be engaging and shareable 
and so extend reach and frame wider debates. Leave EU’s page also combined policy 
messages with campaigning slogans and calls to action in particular combining a 
campaigning message when debunking the economic case for remaining (14% of 
categorized posts) and with their sovereignty-related arguments (12%). Vote Leave had a 
similar if more pronounced structure with campaign-focused sovereignty posts at 23% 
and personality-focused sovereignty posts at 14%. The prominence of personalities as 
both advocates of the Leave position as well as targets for attacks indicates that this 
unofficial campaign pursued a more controversial and attacking stance as well as 
promoting its key spokesperson Nigel Farage. 
Stronger In posts largely promoted the economic argument at the heart of the 
Remain case with 39 per cent of categorized posts being campaign posts about the 
economy and 16 per cent being personality-focused economic messages mainly including 
an expert quote. Lets Stay In Europe, while largely inactive, played the role of attack dog 
producing personality-focused attacks and memes with words categorized as personality 
and blame related often co-occurring with campaign messages and an economic 
argument. Many of these posts were direct attacks on Leave arguments, requesting 
supporters to share if they agreed the Leave case is ‘spurious’, ‘lies’ or ‘rubbish’. 
Table 2: The campaign strategies and agendas demonstrated in Facebook posts (No. and 
as percentage) 
 LeaveEU VoteLeave StrongerIn LetsStayInEurope 
Campaign 575 (64%) 668 (87%) 325 (83%) 19 (66%) 
Personality 364 (41%) 281 (37%) 160 (41%) 15 (52%) 
Economy 361 (40%) 150 (20%) 263 (67%) 12 (41%) 
Sovereignty 290 (32%) 269 (35%) 35 (9%) 3 (10%) 
Immigration 150 (17%) 154 (20%) 41 (10%) 1 (3%) 
Blame 153 (17%) 56 (7%) 42 (11%) 6 (21%) 
Security 51 (6%) 36 (5%) 38 (10%) 4 (14%) 
Comment patterns are an indication of at least interest in the content of a post. For 
Leave followers, negativity proved most popular. Posts containing negative language and 
attributing blame attracted just over 25 per cent more commentators than posts of any 
other category. Personal attack posts were most popular on the Leave EU page; political 
attacks focusing on Remain’s economic arguments gained most comments from Vote 
Leave followers. A good example is a hyperlinked news article claiming ‘Leaving the EU 
may trigger WWIII: Cameron says’, LeaveEU posted this as ‘another spurious claim 
from Dodgy Dave’, subscribers responded with simple negative remarks such as ‘lying 
bastard’ and worse. These findings indicate the Leave community adhered to the 
dynamics of an echo chamber where Leave arguments were celebrated while Remainers 
were criticized and condemned. The veracity of Remain experts’ claims were a particular 
target for commenters, one of the more polite rebuttals is captured in this response: 
‘(Karren) Brady is a millionaire, given jobs by Tories, what’s she know about people not 
getting hospital beds or houses because of immigrants coming here. Bet she was offered a 
gong for this’. In contrast, Botham and Essex were celebrated by commenters as being in-
touch, ordinary and so understanding the concerns and plight of ‘normal’ people. Pro-
Leave entrepreneurs Dyson and Wetherspoon pub chain owner Tim Martin were hailed 
for not toeing the government line; their non-elitism applauded while experts were 
denounced as part of the elite. 
Policy posts seldom generated many comments among Leave followers, and only 
if the focus was to attack an opponent. The only exception was when VoteLeave posted 
policy-related arguments from Nigel Farage, these gained numerous shares as well as 
messages of agreement. This contrasts with commenting patterns among StrongerIn 
followers. They were most likely to engage with posts on the topic of sovereignty; 
sometimes these were expressions of agreement with an attack against the Leave 
campaign, but at other points, there was a greater degree of pluralist debate. Commenters 
at points showed agreement with the Leave campaign’s fundamental point; the string of 
comments following from these posts would conclude on the point that the United 
Kingdom was better off remaining an EU member, but commenters were prone to 
demonstrate was a degree of uncertainty regarding the way the EU was structured and the 
impact the institutions had on the domestic policy of member states. Hence while they 
were quick to act as cheerleaders when StrongerIn attributed blame to opponents, with 
Farage and Boris Johnson emerging as particular hate figures, at points some followers 
appear unequivocal in giving support to the Remain campaign leadership. In particular, 
there was a dearth of support expressed towards David Cameron and George Osborne, 
economic arguments combined with campaign or personality attracted some degree of 
criticism and they were as prone to argue the threats were exaggerated as their opposite 
numbers in the Leave camp. The plurality of discourse perhaps indicates why the Remain 
Facebook campaign overall lacked the same dynamic commitment as that enjoyed by the 
Leave campaign where cheerleading behaviour was the norm. 
High levels of discussion, where multiple commenters make multiple comments 
on posts, reinforce this finding. Whereas posts attributing blame received most 
commentators, they generated the least discussion, with each commentator simply 
leaving a single supportive remark. However when the StrongerIn campaign posted on 
immigration, a rare but still significant occurrence, these generated intense discussion 
among a small number of commenters. As intense discussion may indicate some element 
of pluralism, it is useful to look at the text in comment fields. The data show followers 
were somewhat divided on some of the points relating to open borders, raising concerns 
about free movement of people across the EU. The fact that the StrongerIn page 
generated more intense discussion, almost three times greater (~1.6 against ~0.5–0.6) 
than the two Leave campaigns, further suggests higher levels of disagreement on core 
issues. Similarly, while the majority of commenters were unique to a single page, around 
12,000 commented on posts of all three most popular campaign pages (VoteLeave, 
StrongerIn and LeaveEU), 34,224 (11 per cent of all commenters) comment on posts of 
both any Leave and Remain campaign page posts. As these people commented most on 
Leave sites, in particular acting as cheerleaders, it is suggested that they contributed to 
the divergence of opinion on some issues. Intense discussion and disagreement with the 
campaign were less evident on Leave pages although some comments did express 
hostility to the campaign leaders and arguments. To sum, Remain pages owned the most 
commented and most intensely discussed posts; therefore, they are likely to have seen 
greater divergence of views, debate and trolling. Leave pages earned a broader spread of 
comments across all posts, mostly supportive, little debate occurred and the few attacks 
were simplistic and often personal. Hence, the style of discourse appears to mirror 
commitment levels with Remain page followers at points demonstrating fairly reserved 
support. 
Discussion 
The Facebook pages created by the official campaigns and their unofficial subsidiaries 
for the United Kingdom’s EU membership referendum were essentially campaigning 
pages. The tendency of all four campaigns was to focus on promoting their arguments 
using simple slogans, as well as personalizing their arguments, employing key campaign 
figures, experts or celebrities to reinforce claims or as a way of undermining opponents. 
Policy was secondary and followed the campaign agendas: StrongerIn and LetsStayIn 
focusing on the economy; VoteLeave and LeaveEU on immigration and sovereignty. The 
first key difference was that Leave campaign pages were created earlier and were more 
proactive communicators throughout. Leave page subscribers reciprocated, proving 
equally proactive and highly committed. They more frequently liked and shared page 
content, contributing to heightened visibility, as well as producing greater numbers of 
supportive comments across posts so acting as cheerleaders for the campaign. 
Cheerleading was a particular feature around the Leave campaign’s agenda. The 
almost universal homogeneity was due to the fact that Leave pages appeared to act as 
catch-all platforms for EU detractors; they reiterated longstanding Eurosceptic positions 
prevalent within media (Blumler 2016; Wring 2016), which already had traction among 
the anti-EU political community. The ideological homogeneity was not mirrored on 
Remain pages. While page subscribers appeared to enjoy making attacks on key Leave 
figures, aside from that they displayed a far greater divergence of views. In particular, 
when policy was the focus of debate, Remain pages attracted some intense discussions as 
well as more critical or balanced commentary from within their subscriber network. 
Three factors may explain this that can provide indications about how reading 
social media platforms can help to understand social dynamics around controversial 
issues. Firstly, the voter demographics for the two sides may be mirrored within the 
Facebook communities. Leave voters tended to have lower engagement levels, lower 
educational attainment and so would be less critical citizens (Goodwin and Heath 2016b), 
in contrast the better educated and informed Remain voters would have a more critical 
perspective and so be able to offer more balanced arguments, debate points as well as 
recognizing flaws within a campaign. The characteristics of each voter segment may have 
been replicated within the Facebook communities and so led one to act as cheerleaders 
while the others had a greater propensity to debate the issues. The greater criticality of 
Remain subscribers may have further shaped the dynamics within the page. While the 
social norm for Leave subscribers was to offer uncritical support, Remain subscribers 
could have been encouraged to be more critical, of the campaign, the ‘project fear’ style 
of messages as well as raising important questions regarding the United Kingdom’s 
membership. While subscribers supported the United Kingdom remaining an EU 
member, this was often ‘on balance’. This mood may have fostered greater criticality. 
These findings suggest that campaign dynamics are largely exogenous to a social media 
platform, but that importantly by studying the dynamics of discourse and argumentation 
on social media academics and campaigners can assess the mood and adjust their 
understandings of broader social attitudes and their formation and construction. 
However, this overlooks campaign dynamics that are purely endogenous to a 
platform. The Leave page posts tended to be simplistic, campaigning, often attacking but 
reinforcing a well-established Eurosceptic trope. The Remain campaign offline and 
online has been shown as having been deficient in making an engaging and persuasive 
case that countered the core Leave case (Hughes 2016). The campaign, dubbed ‘project 
fear’, failed to change attitudes, and the replication of these messages on Facebook may 
have encouraged a more critical mood to take hold among subscribers. The scale of the 
supporter communities enjoyed by the three larger campaigns perhaps leads to the 
conclusion that all three factors are likely to have shaped the vibrancy of engagement and 
dynamics of commenting within each page. Demographic differences may have led to 
norms of behaviour emerging which then shaped the behaviour of newly joining or 
engaging subscribers who were encouraged to cheerlead on Leave pages or think more 
critically about issues if they subscribed to Remain. The campaigns, in turn, engaged 
supporters to differing degrees and equally encouraged divergent forms of engagement. 
Given the closeness of the result, it is possible firstly that the Leave campaigns’ 
heightened visibility may have swung some late deciders into that camp. Secondly, the 
more critical and balanced views of Remain subscribers may have softened the position 
of some who may have started off with a clear perspective but could have been led to 
doubt their judgment. Hence, the Facebook communities may allow insights into the 
broader dynamics of the campaign and replicate conversations that may have occurred in 
the third places that allow face-to-face interaction. The divergences of opinions found in 
the Remain communities may also underline a lack of unreserved commitment and so 
explain the lower energy the campaign enjoyed and why in the end at the last moment 
more votes were cast for Leave than Remain. 
Hence, we might argue that studying the Brexit camps on Facebook offers 
insights into wider societal dynamics that are perhaps encouraged as well as made visible 
by social media. Certainly it suggests academics and social analysts can gain insights into 
the dynamics of attitudes and beliefs that persist within a given group (Anstead and 
O’Loughlin 2015) at a minimum. However, research that aggregates big data has 
limitations, even when attempts are made to validate assumptions through hand coding. 
More innovative research among Facebook users, in particular members of political or 
campaign-oriented communities, is required to gain an understanding of what factors 
determine behaviours. The data do however allow us to make assumptions that have face 
validity based on research into the campaign (Jackson et al. 2016) and internal validity 
due to the qualitative exploration of the discourse. We can see that two camps came 
together around the campaign, and the camps reflected many of the characteristics of 
tribal political communities, such as their propensity to mock and attack opponents. But 
the camps also established different norms of behaviour, one unquestioning, one critical, 
suggesting that these and many similar Facebook camps actually represent in microcosm 
the wider political communities from which they are drawn. 
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